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ABSTRACT 
A failure is an event at which the system does 
not perform according to specifications. 
In order to cope with failures, additional 
components and algorithms can be added to a system. 
These components and algorithms attempt to ensure 
that occurrences at erroneous states do not result in 
later system failures.  Ideally, they remove these 
errors and restore them to "correct" states from which 
normal processing can continue.  These additional 
components and abnormal algorithms are called 
recovery techniques. 
The purpose of this thesis is to make a primary 
study on recovery techniques for database management 
systems. 
In Chapter 1 the concept of database is defined 
as an abstraction of secondary storage provided to 
the user by the database system.  The database manage- 
ment systems implements the user operations on the 
database and implements the data structures on secondary 
storage. 
In Chapter 2 the states of database are defined. 
The database can be in a correct state, a valid state 
or a consistent state. 
In Chapter 3 the categories of recovery techniques 
known and used at present are briefly described; the 
kinds of recoveries they provide, and the relationships 
among the techniques are given. 
In Chapter 4 the auditing of a database application 
is defined as the net of monitoring the application for 
compliance with rules and practices.  In the case the 
system does not perform according to the specifications, 
the auditing process is responsible for keeping enough 
information for error recovery. 
In Chapter 5 a database audit trail is defined 
as a generalized recording of who did what to whom, 
when, and in what sequence.  This information is to be 
used to satisfy system integrity, recovery, auditing, 
and security requirements of advanced database systems. 
It is hypothesized what information must be retained in 
the audit trail to permit recovery and audit later in 
time and a scheme of organizing the contents of the 
audit trail so as to provide the required functions at 
a minimum overhead. 
INTRODUCTION 
A failure is an event at which the system does not 
perform according to specifications.  Failures are 
caused by: 
1) Hardware faults - 
2) Software faults 
3) Human errors. 
For example a power failure, or disk failure, are caused 
by hardware, while bugs in programs, or invalid data, 
are software faults, and if the operator mounts a wrong 
tape on a drive that's a human error. 
A failure occurs when an erroneous state of the 
system is processed by algoriths of the system.  (The 
term "erroneous state", a somehow generalized term, 
instead of the term "non-consistent state", is used 
here.  "Consistent state" is defined later.) An 
erroneous state is defined as one containing at least 
one error.  An error is a piece of information which 
can cause a failure. 
In order to cope with failures, additional compo- 
nents and algorithms can be added to a system.  These 
components and algorithms attempt to ensure that 
vi" 
occurrences of erroneous states do not result in later 
system failures, ideally, they remove these errors and 
restore them to "correct" states from which normal 
processing can continue.  These additional components 
and abnormal algorithms, are called recovery techniques. 
There are many kinds of failures and therefore 
many kinds of recovery.  There is also always a limit 
to the kind of recovery that can be provided.  If for 
example a failure corrupts not only the ordinary data, 
but also the redundant data, maintained to make re- 
covery possible, a complete recovery may be impossible. 
Some generalized questions have to be answered in 
such an environment, like the following: 
a) What are the appropriate data structures for 
keeping the current values? What should be 
the data structures for the recovery data, 
to make the restoration of previous values 
possible? 
b) How should the above mentioned data structures 
and recovery data be structured, organized 
and manipulated to make recovery possible? 
c) What kinds of failures can be coped with by 
the different organizations? 
d) How can different techniques be combined in 
one system to cope with different failures 
or to provide different kinds of recovery? 
(E.g., one technique may be used as a fall 
back for another one). 
DATABASE - DATABASE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (DBMS) 
The concepts of database, file, and information 
are logical.  The physical database is held in secondary 
storage.  Secondary storage is nonvolatile storage 
space, which retains the database whether or not it is 
online.  Secondary storage consists of physical records, 
which are the smallest accessible units.  Records are 
read or written by a storage device unit at the 
request of the computer. 
A database is an abstraction of secondary storage 
provided to the user by the database system.  The 
overall logical database description is referred to as 
a schema.  It is sometimes also referred to as an 
overall model of the data, a conceptual model, or a 
conceptual schema.  These terms mean essentially the 
same thing.. 
A schema is a chart of the types of data that 
are used.  It gives the names of the entities and 
attributes, and specifies the relations between them. 
It is a framework into which the values of the data 
items can be fitted.  The term subschema refers to an 
application programmer's view of the data he uses. 
Many differnet subschemas can be derived from one 
schema. 
The database management system implements the 
user operations on the database and implements the 
data structures on secondary storage.  The main 
events that occur when an appliction program, using 
one subschema of the database, reads a record by 
means of a database management system, are shown in 
Fig. 1 (Steps 5-14). 
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STATES OF A DATABASE 
The data that can be retrieved by users from the 
database forms the informatton in the database.  Users 
may add, delete, and update data. 
The database is in a correct state if the informa- 
tion in it consists of the most recent copies of data 
put in the database by users and contains no data 
deleted by users. 
A database is in a valid state if its information 
is part of the information in a correct state.  This 
implies that there are no spurious data although some 
information may have been lost. 
If for example a data field is unreadable, or a 
pointer points to a record which the system can't 
read then we have lost data.  On the other hand if a 
list which is supposed to have 6 names by declaration 
has only 5 then we have again lost data, and we have 
a valid state since there are no spurious data. 
Questionable here is if the state is consistent or 
not.  Information may be lost if buffers are lost 
after a crash. 
A database is in a consistent state if it is in 
a valid state, and the information it holds satisfies 
the users' consistency constraints. 
Of course a correct state is also a consistent 
state.  The three states defined above can be clarified 
by the state of a database at the time a machine is 
suddenly halted.  If the data base is defined at that 
time, then this state is called the correct state. 
If no state is defined for the database, a salvager 
can be run to delete parts of the database in order 
to restore the system to a defined state:  a valid 
state.  If the salvager also makes sure that user's + 
consistency constrains are maintained, then the 
restore state is a consistent state.  Consistency 
will have to be a well-defined notion for every data- 
base.  Different sorts of consistencies (possibly at 
different levels of abstraction) or degrees of con- 
sistencies may be defined. 
A failure of the system occurs when that system 
does not meet its specifications.  Recovery is the 
restoration of the database after a failure to a 
state that is acceptable to the users.  The notion 
of "acceptable" is different for different environ- 
ments; in general "acceptable" will mean correct, 
valid or consistent.  A recovery technique provides 
recovery from certain kinds of failures.  Within a 
10 
single system, there may be several different recovery 
techniques corresponding to different kinds of failures. 
A recovery technique maintains recovery data to 
make recovery possible.  It provides recovery from any 
failure which does not affect the recovery data or 
the mechanisms used to maintain these data and to 
restore the states of the data in the database. 
Failures are classified into two groups with 
respect to a recovery technique.  A failure with which 
a recovery technique can cope is a crash of the 
system with respect to that recovery technique.  A 
failure with which a recovery technique cannot cope 
is called a catastrophe with respect to that technique. 
No single recovery technique or series of recovery 
techniques can cope with every possible failure.  Many 
different kinds of recovery procedures have been 
developed, each technique with its own particular 
advantages and disadvantages, but each enabling the 
system to cope with different kinds of failures in 
different environments. 
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OVERVIEW OF RECOVERY TECHNIQUES        u 
In the following sections the categories of 
recovery techniques known and used at present are 
briefly described; the kinds of recoveries they 
provide and the relationships among the techniques 
are given.  Next one of those techniques (the audit 
trail) is defined and described in detail.  Its 
requirements and concepts will be analysed and a 
general methodology in designing an audit trail will 
be derived. 
The kinds of recovery considered are:  (JOOST 
S.M. VERHOFSTAD) 
1) Reovery to the correct state 
2) Recovery to a correct state which existed at 
some moment in the past (i.e. a checkpoint) 
3) Recovery to a possible previous state; this 
would allow, for example, restoration of a 
set of previously existing states of files 
that may not have existed simultaneously 
before. 
4) Recovery to a valid state 
5) Recovery to a consistent state 
6) Crash resistance (explained below). 
12 
Crash resistance is provided in such a way that the 
normal algorithms of the system operate on the data in 
such a manner that after certain failures the system 
will always be in a correct state.  Thus, crash 
resistance abviates the need, for recovery techniques 
to cope with a certain class of failures.  Whereas 
other kinds of recovery explicitly restore states, 
crash resistance maintains correct states by the way 
data are manipulated and maintained during normal 
processing.  Thus, in a sense, crash resistance restores 
states implicitly. 
A checkpoint is a (presumably correct) past state; 
it may have been made by recording the past state 
explicitly.  Checkpoints can be established either for 
files or for the whole database.  The creation of a 
checkpoint is called checkpointing.  Establishing a 
checkpoint explicitly creates a backup version which 
is a complete copy at the checkpointed database.  The 
term backing up means restoring the state of the 
previous checkpoint, while the* term backing out is 
related to processes or transactions.  A process is 
backed out if all the effects of the operations per- 
formed by that process are undone.  This means that 
only the files affected by the process need to be 
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restored.  So the total database is restored to a state 
which has been termed a "possible previously existing 
state". 
Techniques used for recovery, restart, and main- 
tenance of consistency are divided here into seven 
categories.  (This categorization is, of course, not 
the only possible one. ) 
1)  Salvation program 
A salvation program in a database system is used 
after a crash to restore the database to some consistent 
state.  The salvation program tries to restore the 
state of the database as it was before or at the time 
of the failure.  It uses no recovery data.  (It is the 
only technique considered here which does not use 
recovery data).  It is used after a crash if other 
recovery techniques (using recovery data) fail or are 
not used, or if no crash resistance is provided. 
A salvation program scans through the data struc- 
tures and tries to reconstruct the database or restore 
consistency, possibly at the cost of deleting some 
files or data. 
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2) Incremental dumping 
Incremental dumping Is used to copy updated files 
onto archive storage (usually tape); It checkpoints 
files that have been altered.  Incremental dumping Is 
normally done after a job Is finished, but can also be 
done at regular Intervals, while continued use Is made 
of the files, thereby providing more frequent check- 
points.  After a crash has occurred the Incremental 
dump tapes can be used to bring all the files to their 
previous consistent state, so that jobs completed 
before the crash will not be lost.  All updates per- 
formed by jobs running at the time of the crash may 
not be restored completely by the processing of the 
incremental dump tape after a crash, because some 
active files may not have been dumped in time. 
3) Audit trail 
An audit trail records the sequence of actions 
performed on a file.  The audit trail contains infor- 
mation about the effects of the operations, the times 
and dates at which the operations occurred, and the 
identification codes of the user (or user programs) 
issuing the operation.  It can be used to restore 
files to their states prior to a crash or to back out 
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particular processes.  It can also be used for certify- 
ing that rules and laws are obeyed in the system.  An 
audit trail provides the means to back out a process 
whereas incremental dumping merely provides the means 
to restore files to previous consistent states. 
4)  Differential files 
Under the differential file scheme the main files 
are kept unchanged until reorganization.  All changes 
that would be made to a main file as a result of 
transactions performed are registered in a differential 
file which records all the alterations requested for 
the main file.  The differential file will always be 
searched first when data is to be retrieved.  Data 
not found in the differential file is retrieved from 
the main database.  The most recent entry for a given 
record in the differential file must always be re- 
trieved.  The main files are regularly merged with 
the differential files, thereby emptying the differen- 
tial files.  A differential file is a type of audit 
trail, but the actual updates have not yet occurred. 
The differential file can also be used to implement 
crash resistance. 
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5) Backup and current versions 
The files containing the present values of existing 
files form the current version of the database.  Files 
containing previous values form a consistent, backup 
version of the database.  Backup versions of files of 
databases can be kept in order to make possible the 
restoration of the files to a previous state. 
6) Multiple copies 
More than one copy of each file is held. The 
different copies are identical except during update. 
The technique of multiple copies includes two 
techniques: 
a) keeping an odd number of copies of the data. 
If a majority of the copies have the same 
value then that value is taken as the correct 
one.  This technique is then called majority 
voting. 
b) Holding two copies with flags to indicate 
"update-in-progress".  An inconsistent copy 
(or suspicious copy) is always recognizably 
inconsistent, because of the flags used; if 
the system crashes during update the flag 
will still be set after the crash. 
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Thus technique provides crash resistance; it may 
be used to detect faults if the different copies are 
kept on different devices or handled by different 
processors.  The difference between multiple copies 
and backup/current version is that with multiple 
copies all copies are active, while with backup/current 
version there is only one active copy. 
7)  Careful replacement 
The objective of careful replacement is to avoid 
updating data structures "in place".  The update is 
performed on a copy of a component (record, page, 
disk-block), which replaces the original only if the 
update is successful; and the copy is kept until after 
the replacement is made successfully.  The difference 
between this and the other methods is that two copies 
exist only during update.  The technique is used to 
provide crash resistance, for the original will always 
be available in case a crash occurs during update. 
The seven techniques under discussion provide 
recovery, crash resistance, and maintenance of con- 
sistency in one of three ways: 
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i) The way in which the data is structured.  The 
multiple copies, differential files and backup 
techniques are part of the structure of the 
database, 
ii)  The way in which the data is updated and 
manipulated.  The careful replacement tech- 
nique is a crash-resistant way of updating 
complex data structures.  It has been shown 
(VERHOFSTAD, J.S.M., "Recovery and crash 
resistance in a filing system" in Proc 1977 
ACM S1GM0D Int. Cont. on Management of Data, 
ACM, New York pp. 158-167.) that this also 
sets special constraints and requirements 
for the data structures, 
iii)  The provision of utilities.  The salvation 
program, incremental dumper and audit trail 
facility are utilities which have nothing to 
do with the way in which the data is structured 
or updated.  They could be regarded as external 
utilities, which can usually be added to any 
database system without great difficulty. 
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AUDITING 
The common areas of audit action throughout its 
history have been examining, verifying and reporting. 
In advanced database systems more manual processes 
and applications will be computerized.  The audit 
support must be commensurate with the support to auto- 
mate new processes.  Otherwise, the inability to audit 
will limit new applications from being committed to an 
unauditable computerized environment. 
Auditing of a database/data communication applica- 
tion is defined as the act of monitoring the application 
for compliance with accounting rules and practices. 
Auditing an application is essentially certifying the 
integrity of the system by verifying that rules and 
policies dictated by laws, business agreements etc. 
are being followed by the application (L.A. Bjock, Jr.). 
In the case the system does not perform according 
to the specifications, the auditing process is respon- 
sible for keeping enough information for error recovery. 
Traditionally, the responsibilities of the auditor 
have included: 
1.  protecting the assets of the organization 
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2. ensuring adherence to policy 
3. and ensuring the adequacy of controls and 
procedures. 
The auditor's tests and examinations have included 
comparing actual conditions to standards of good prac- 
tice, to policy or other expectations, and to environ- 
ment . 
Data processing security has been concerned with 
protecting all of the resources associated with the 
data processing mission, plus all data within data 
processing custody. 
It is clear that since both, security and audit, 
are concerned with protecting resources and assets, 
they complement each other. 
However, it follows that in order for the auditor 
to fulfill his role, it is essential that he have the 
following. 
1. a workable definitipn of security 
2. an explicit statement of policy 
3. accepted standards of good practice 
4. access to the function to be audited 
5. adequate resource. 
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In addition he must know what tests and examinations 
are appropriate for the assets to be protected and the 
hazards to which they are subject.  Finally, he must 
know how to allocate his limited resource in such a 
way as to maximize the usefulness of his findings, and 
he must know how to communicate those findings in such 
a way as to maximize system reliability and acceptance. 
The audit function, e.g. recording of audit trails, 
the verification-of-results function, etc. must be 
system-supported to the same level as the dependence 
being placed on the on-line data by the terminal 
user.  In such an environment the sequence of processes 
interacting with the database is less repeatable than 
in a batch environment.  This sequence is due to the 
random arrival of incoming transactions rather than 
the preplanned processing sequence typical of batch 
processing.*  Therefore, a generalized audit trail 
facility must be provided that tracks data usage and 
captures the unrepeatable sequence of processes during 
the execution of the process itself. 
There are three basic objects of interest for 
audit in a database environment, namely: 
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a) The user:  who entered, what data, from what 
terminal, etc. 
b) the program:  what's the identity of the pro- 
gram, on a given execution of a 
program what version was used, 
what branches were taken under 
what conditions, etc. 
c) the data:  what was a particular field value 
before a specific transaction up- 
dated it and what was its value 
after update. 
These objects and their interactions are usually 
identified as being within a common boundary for each 
invocation of the program.  This common boundary is 
identified by a transaction name which usually serves 
multiple purposes within the system such as scheduling, 
recovery (backout) and auditing. 
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TYPES OF AUDIT 
Four major types of audit are of interest for 
advanced data base/dat communication (DB/DC) systems, 
These types are shown in Figure 2 
IN PROCESS POST PROCESS 
!    ^ 
i           i 
t    A2    » 
i           i 
;   A3 •'    A4    ! 
TRANSPARENT 
NOT 
TRANSPARENT 
Figure 2 
In-process signifies that the monitoring of the 
application and verification for adherence to specified 
rules are performed while the process being audited is 
in execution.  Post-process signifies that the recording 
of the audit trail is performed concurently with the 
process to be audited, but the audit itself is performed 
after completion of the process.  Transparent or not 
signifies whether the process to be audited is aware 
of the audit. 
The four types of audit have the following 
characteristics: 
Al  is where the audit is being performed in real 
time transparently to the on-going process being audited. 
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Examples of Al are: 
1) The auditor introduces test transactions into 
the system and verifies the process being 
audited by analyzing the outputs based on 
specific inputs. 
2) Two asynchronous processes with one monitoring 
the other at defined audit points. 
3) Full interpretation with the audit process 
being the interpreter of the process being 
audited. 
A characteristic of Al is that the audit function 
(auditor), in addition to being transparent to the on- 
going process, does not alter the course of the process. 
If an in-process audit finds a violation (of accounting 
practices for example), the usual procedure is not to 
stop the audited process but rather to have the person 
or group responsible for the erring process fix it and 
then issue adjustments to the incorrect outputs. 
Additionally, Al has the characteristic of not 
requiring an audit trail since the auditing function 
is performed in-process. 
A2 is an "after-the-fact" audit in which a 
process or person looks back in time at the effects, 
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actions, algorithms, etc., of an earlier process.  This 
type requires a recording of a great deal more informa- 
tion than an audit may actually require and use since 
all the earlier processing is rarely audited.  A 
sampling technique usually chooses which subset to 
actually audit out of all recorded data. 
A3 is an in-line audit of the application's 
process.  What audit rules, when to apply them, and 
their results must be preplanned as part of the 
application.  A3 is different from Al in that the 
audit rules in A3 cannot be changed without repro- 
gramming the process.  An example of A3  is the 
application displaying certain data (to an auditor) 
when a specific transaction type of instance is 
encountered. 
AA is the case of the process to be audited 
explicitly saving what is required for an audit of 
the process later in time.  A4 is typically used in 
the debugging made in which the debug tools (e.g. 
trace, storage dumps, etc) are invoked in-line for 
analysis later in time.  The data saved may also be 
used for recovery purposes such as determining what 
the initial values were during process execution.    ' 
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ASSUMPTIONS 
In developing general trail concepts certain 
assumptions have to be made regarding the audit 
environment.  These are: 
1. The auditing must be permitted by the following 
classes of objects: 
(a) data type - fields, records, files 
(b) application transaction levels 
(c) user 
(d) terminal 
(e) any combination of the above. 
2. The auditor requires the system to retain all the 
information needed for addressability later in 
time such as  (a) identity of transaction, (b) name 
and version of procedure, (c) time stamp unique 
with respect to sequence, (d) sequence flow be- 
tween related transactions.  This will be evident 
frorn^ the methodology applied deriving the auditing 
trail. 
At this point we mention the inconsistency be- 
tween keeping enough information to provide crash 
resistance, and a selective auditing.  This apparent 
inconsistency may be faced as follows: 
27 
a) The structured programming techniques applied 
on code, may provide us with sufficient 
modularity in the sequence of actions to be 
audited.  If the modules then are "sufficiently" 
independent a selective auditing may not lead 
to an inconsistency, because then we are 
provided with sufficient bounds of action. 
b) Of course this selective auditing trail is not 
sufficient if the auditing trail is going to 
be used for hardware crashes.  It is more 
suitable for verifying the integrity of soft- 
ware modules, which means in all situations 
the software perform according to specifica- 
tions. 
c) Auditing trail planned for hardware crashes 
cannot be selective because by not knowing in 
advance when the hardware will fail, we cannot 
avoid inconsistency.  The solution here is an 
auditing trail for the whole transaction. 
3.  The act of establishing and activating audit hooks 
must be capable of being dynamic (as well as 
static) and performed against an on-going process 
without logically interrupting the process. 
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4. The system must support "transparent event descriptors" 
whose content defines the conditions under which a 
recording is to be made for later audit and recovery 
purposes.  Examples of what the descriptor must 
contain are:  (a) a process to be audited (b) when 
(time)  (c) what data and values  (d) what operators, 
and combinations of data and operators  (e) what 
level and sequence of transactions are to be audited 
and  (f) what information to record when the event 
is either true or false. 
5. The system support for the audit function must be 
standardized accross application systems - not a 
special audit facility for each application sub- 
system. 
6. The auditor must be able to use the same termino- 
logy and names for an "after-the-fact" audit as 
were used during the process itself.  Examples are: 
(a) field names and  (b) procedure names.  In 
general names of processes needed by the auditor 
to locate spurious facts have to be presented in 
the audit trail. 
7. The auditor (by command and procedure) requires the 
following type of update capability by version of 
field 
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a) The ability to logically supercede the "now" 
(most recently recorded) version  (a) prior to 
any dependent use (i.e. use for the purpose of 
making a decision) by another process and 
(b) after dependent use by another process. 
The requirement is recursive in that multiple 
logical supersedures must be supported. 
This capability is needed by the auditor. 
It is the auditors responsibility though to 
know when and how to use it, because the value 
of a field may be related to other fields and 
then a complete chain of updates is needed. 
When is another question greatly dependent on 
the particular database.  This is because 
such an action needs "cross-reference" infor- 
mation to point out the inconsistency and to 
call the auditor for "action". 
b) The ability to logically supersede an earlier 
version later in time  (a) prior to any depen- 
dent use of the earlier version and  (b) after 
dependent use of the earlier version.  This 
requirement is also recursive. 
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FORMAL DEFINITIONS:  1) AUDIT TRAIL 
2) PROGRAM INTEGRITY 
3) DATA INTEGRITY 
A formal definition of an audit trail may be: 
A history of activities by transaction, posted because 
of selected operations on specific data.  Selected 
operations are those functions that are defined (via 
transparent event descriptors) as events to be noted 
in the audit trail as a consequence of a particular 
interaction with the data base (L.A. BJOCK, Jr.) 
For example, the selected operations might just 
be updates (as is required for simple backout) or may 
also include references to data (for scoping the 
bounds of propagated errors). 
At this point we will distinguish the audit 
approaches and techniques for: 
a) Evaluation of program integrity in a trans- 
action on a database. 
b) Evaluation of data integrity in a database. 
Program integrity has been defined as that state 
in which the software is logically complete, and 
correctly and consistently performs the task for which 
it was designed and no more.  By "no more" here we 
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mean to exclude all unintended direct or Indirect 
effects.  An unstopped but correct loop Is a classical 
example of a program performing Its tasks and something 
more, or a program overwriting on the same file after 
it reaches the end of the file. 
Data integrity is the state that exists when 
computerized data is the same as that in the source 
documentation and has not been exposed to accidental 
alteration or destruction. 
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DATA INTEGRITY 
Data integrity is the state that exists when data 
are (within defined limits of reliability) accurate, 
consistent, authorized, valid, complete, unambiguous, 
and processed according to specifications in a timely 
manner. 
An audit and evaluation of ADP security calls for 
an examination of the system of safeguards used to 
prevent, deter, detect, and limit the impact of un- 
desirable events. 
An adequate system of safeguards is one having 
design, implementation, and compliance characteristics 
appropriate to the magnitude of the risks and exposures 
associated with undesirable events.  Examples of 
undesirable events include:  an unauthorized update 
to database records, and an illegal tap on a data 
communications line.  Examples of exposures include: 
destruction of assets, erroneous disbursement of funds, 
embezzlement and fraud, disclosure of personal or 
proprietary information. 
Specifically, a data integrity audit must evaluate 
the policies and procedures that directly affect the 
quality of all forms of data (e.g. source, entry, 
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processed, and output) in the application system under 
review.  As a prerequisite to a data integrity audit, 
the auditor must have a clear understanding of the 
definition of data integrity and the objective and 
scope of the audit.  To perform the audit, the auditor 
roust first formulate an approach or work plan and then 
use appropriate and acceptable methods for conducting 
the audit. 
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OBJECTIVE OF THE DATA INTEGRITY AUDIT 
The objective of a data integrity audit of a 
particular application system is to render an objective 
opinion based on an evaluation by qualified individuals(s) 
as to the: 
(1) Compliance with existing policies and pro- 
cedures for maintaining data integrity. 
(2) Adequacy of the existing policies and 
procedures. 
In addition, as a result of the compliance and 
adequacy evaluations, corrective actions may be 
recommended to enhance the data integrity of the 
application system.  Furthermore, it is essential 
that the date the audit is completed be recorded since 
it represents a specific reference point. 
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APPROACH TO A DATA INTEGRITY AUDIT 
The success of a data integrity audit depends 
upon the thorough formulation of an approach or work 
plan for auditing the application system.  The formu- 
lation of a work plan should include the following 
steps: 
1. Obtain an understanding of the organizations, 
policies, procedures and practices pertaining 
to the application system under review. 
2. Obtain a general understanding of the applica- 
tion system, including factors such as the 
intended purpose or function, the requirements 
of the user community, the source and flow of 
input data, the processing requirements, the 
output requirements and relevant time 
constraints. 
3. Identify specific data files, inputs, processing 
steps, interfaces with other applications and 
outputs which are utilized throughout the 
application. 
4. Identify specific control features at points 
that affect data integrity. 
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5. Decide upon the methodology (i.e. audit tools 
and methods) that will be used when conducting 
the audit. 
6. Obtain an understanding of the human factors 
that affect the application system, including 
the human engineering aspects of the user 
interface. 
7. Obtain an understanding of the hardware, soft- 
ware and systems technologies used in the 
application system. 
8. Obtain an understanding of the application 
system's development, implementation and 
v,       maintenance controls. 
9. Decide on the form of reporting the findings, 
conclusions, and recomentations of the audit. 
10.  Decide on review procedures for the audit 
that will assure high technical quality of 
the audit. 
Once the objective, approach and work plan for a 
data integrity audit of a particular application system 
have been established, the audit should be conducted 
using appropriate audit tools and methods.  Following 
the audit, a draft report of findings, conclusions, 
and recommendations should be prepared by the auditors. 
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METHODS FOR DATA INTEGRITY AUDITING 
In conducting the audit, a variety of audit tools 
and methods may be used to determine the compliance 
with and adequacy of the policies and procedures 
intented to insure data integrity in the applications 
system under review.  Examples are discussed below, 
and a methodology in developing an auditing trail is 
described. 
1.  Sampling techniques where portions of the data 
population, usually randomly selected items, are 
inspected to determine the state of the data. 
Discovery sampling is intended to uncover the 
existence of errors.  If errors are found, addi- 
tional samples may be taken and estimation sampling 
applied to them.  Estimation sampling is used to 
determine the extent of erronous data in a data 
base by applying statistical techniques to a 
sample of the data for the purpose of predicting 
the amount of contamination.  Attribute sampling 
may be used to select records based on incon- 
sistencies in characteristics within the record 
itself (for example, an accounts receivable 
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balance that exceeds the credit limit by 10 percent 
or more). It may also be used to test a population 
for the presence of particular characteristics. 
2. Parallel processing checks for correct processing 
of data by the application system.  With this 
technique, data processed by the application system 
would be processed by an independent program per- 
forming the same functions.  The two results would 
then be compared. 
3. Integrated Test Facility allows the auditor to 
continuously monitor the performance of the 
application system by incorporating dummy master 
records into the database.  Once these records 
are in place, the auditor can process test trans- 
actions against them by including the test trans- 
actions with the live data during the normal pro- 
cessing cycle.  The auditor can then compare the 
processing results with predetermined results. 
4. System Control Audit Review Files involves the 
placement of auditor-designed tests within the 
application system program code.  During normal 
processing, the audit tests are performed on the 
processed data.  Either processing exception or 
predetermined sample solution criteria is used to 
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extract the desired records and write them on a 
review file the auditor can then examine the 
review file and draw appropriate conclusions. 
5. Tracing gives the auditor the ability to follow 
(trace) specifically marked or tagged input trans- 
actions as they are being processed by the applica- 
tion system.  It requires the insertion of addi- 
tional code into the application system and an 
extra field in the transactions for the tag.  This 
code generates a processing record or trail for 
the marked transactions which can be analyzed by 
the auditor to determine if the processing is 
correct. 
6. Test decks of test data can be used for the testing 
of new or modified applications programs before 
they are placed in production or for testing the 
application system's processing integrity.  In 
either case, a set of test input transactions is 
processed by the application system and the results 
are compared with predetermined results. 
7. Questionnaires are a traditional audit tool for 
obtaining information about an application system 
and for evaluating controls to determine adequacy 
and compliance.  They are most effective when 
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tailored for particular types of applications such 
as payroll, purchasing, inventory, etc. and provide 
preliminary information for a more thorough evalua- 
tion. 
8. Automatic flowcharting software consists of soft- 
ware routines which convert program source state- 
ments into flow charts which graphically describe 
the program logic.  The use of flowcharting soft- 
ware makes it easier to understand the logic of a 
program and also guarantees that the auditor has a 
current flow chart when he is reviewing the 
application system.  However, reading the flow 
charts usually requires some programming expertise. 
Flow charts are most useful when the auditor is 
looking at particular problem areas.  As with 
source code review, reading logic flowcharts may 
be of limited value in auditing for data integrity. 
9. Continuous monitoring and surveillance software. 
Software monitors are programs which execute con- 
currently with the application system in an attempt 
to determine resource usage and system bottlenecks. 
Surveillance software provides real-time monitoring 
of the application system in an attempt to detect 
erroneous or exceptional events during processing. 
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Specific examples of surveillance software are 
the Integrated Test Facility and the System 
Control Audit Review Files discussed previously. 
In the next pages a methodology of an audit trail 
is being presented.  This audit trail gives the 
auditor the ability to trace input transactions.  It 
is a tool being used in the fifth method mentioned 
before.  On the other hand as executing concurrently 
with the application system in an attempt to determine 
data usage and system bottlenecks is relevant to the 
last method also. 
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METHODOLOGY OF AN AUDIT TRAIL 
Figure 1.  Stored record occurrences 
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The audit trail concept adds the time dimension 
as a third coordinate to Figure 1. 
Figure 2.  Time domain addressing concept 
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F(ijk)  is field i, id j, version k (where k-1 prior 
values have been previously recorded) within set 
occurrences. 
ids are unique within set through time 
values of unchanged fields are logically replicated 
from version to version. 
A3 
Figure 2 shows the time dimension with the "now" 
values being the closest to the origin and prior values 
(versions) going chronologically back through time as 
one traverses the time coordinate.  To locate a unique 
value, an  (i,j,k)  coordinate must be specified where 
i  is the field name (assumed) unique through all 
versions of values), j  is the unique stored record 
identifier (also assumed unique through time), and k 
is the point in time for the desired value.  If, in 
addition, supplemental information is kept about each 
version of the field (who created it, when, etc.) we 
have the complete audit trail concept. 
A possible audit trail organization is presented. 
This example explains in a generalized implementation 
sen are a typical sequence of operations on "now" and 
"prior" field values. 
One possible organization implementing and audit 
trail is as in Figure 3. 
44 
i USER 
Organization 
and 
Accessing 
Language 
Accessing 
Procedures 
10. 
System 
Audit Trail 
Management 
Figure 3.  Modules of the System 
The following assumptions are made: 
a)  The operations of create, reference, and update for 
field .x are to be recorded in the audit trail as 
a specification of the audit trail event descriptor. 
In the notation of page 9 by "field x" we mean all 
f(ijk) where i«x; that is, that field in all 
occurrences of the record type, for all time. 
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b) The time stamp is unique with respect to audit trail 
entries per field. (By the concatenation time-ffield 
we can have unique identifiers for the occurences 
of the fields.) 
c) The field name x remains constant for all genera- 
tions of values of x. 
d) The stored-record identifier remains constant 
through all generations of non identifier fields. 
e) If additional audit trail contents are needed they 
are to be implemented in a similar way. 
The audit trail consists of two parts:  the "now" 
value and the history of prior activities.  The "now" 
values is the latest version of a certain occurrence 
of field x and contains (in this example) only the 
value.  Each history (audit trail entry) consists of 
a four-way relation  (v,t,op,I)    where v is the 
value at time t, op is the operation that caused the 
audit trail entry and I    is an ordered set of link- 
ages to prior audit trail entries. 
Op may be an ordered set of names representing 
not only the operation that caused the audit trail 
entry, but also the program segment (represented by 
an ID), by which the operations was called. 
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ORGANIZATION OP THE CONTENTS OF THE AUDIT TRAIL 
1.  Create an occurrence of field x at time t . with o 
given value - Create x-10 ,at tQ.  Only the 
audit trail for field x is considered.  Thus 
the audit trail contains: 
10|(10,to,C,-) 
where  |  separates the two parts into the "now" 
value and the history of former values.  C denotes 
the create operation.  The audit trail will contain 
the history of many occurrences of the field, all 
interleaved, but with pointers making it possible 
to trace the history of any desired occurrence. 
The "now" value 10 is associated with the"most 
recent (and only) audit trail entry. 
The name of the field (actually an identifier 
of the form record+field) is not present in this 
audit trail.  Since all the operations in the 
example are going to refer to the same field, by 
the assumption we made, it is not significant to 
include it here.  This does not happen in a general 
situation where the name is significant.  This is 
is illustrated in the Example on Page 53. 
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We will often be referring to the "newest 
occurrence" of a field.  By this we mean the 
occurrence with the latest Create time.  The "now" 
value is always the value of the latest version 
of the newest occurrence. 
2. Reference x - Reference x  of the newest occurrence 
at time  t,.  The audit trail after the reference 
appears as: 
10l(10,t1,R,|) (10,to>C,-) 
The underscore arrow corresponds to the first 
element of the set of linkages, and it is the 
real-time sequence of operations on field x. 
If the reference is made to data not present in 
the audit trail the return values is a reserved 
symbol. 
3. Update x - Update x of the newest occurrence to 12 
at time ty. 
12|(12,t2,U ) (lO.t^R, ) (ip,t.C,-) 
I £ I _J 
Updates frequently depend on combining data from 
some other field and they can be done by different 
program segments.  So it is useful for the opera- 
tion U to represent not only the actual operation 
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but the ID of the program segment as well, which 
causes the operation.  Also the operation may need 
pointers to point to other fields, as is explained 
in Example (ii). 
4.  Refer to earlier occurrence.  Refer to x(tj)  at 
time  t,.  This reference, being asked at time  t*, 
is to the value of certain version of an occurrence 
of the field, namely the value last referred to at 
time  t,.  The value of x  returned is 10. 
121(10^3,^') (12,t2,U,j ) (10,t1,R,| ) (10,to,C,-) 
I * 
The overscore arrow corresponds to the second 
element of the set of linkages and it indicates 
which occurrence and version of x was referenced, 
as contrasted with Step 2, before, where the 
assumption was the "now" value.  Notice that we 
don't necessarily refer to the latest version of 
a particular occurrence, although that's the 
commonest situation. 
The underscore linkage from the "now" value, 
12, to the t2 audit trail entry is required to 
provide addressability to the supplemental infor- 
mation recorded when x was updated to 12.  In 
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other word8, the head of the push-down stack shows 
activity on an earlier version of the newest 
occurrence of the record containing x, not the 
"now" value. 
In effect, this is a two-level audit trail: 
The first level is the audit trail at activities 
of the newest occurrence of the field; the second 
is the activities "now" against the "then" values. 
5.  Update the value of x  in an earlier occurrence 
or version, 
i)  Update x in an earlier version of the newest 
occurrence.  Update x(t«)  to 25 at time t,. 
 1 , j 
12|(25,t4,U,|)(10,t3,R,|)(12,t2>U,|)(10,t1>R,|)qo,t0,C,-) 
■f- 
The  t,  audit trail entry now indicates that the 
update to x  at  t« has been superseded by the 
t4  entry. 
The fact that the 25 arose as a result of a 
correction of an earlier occurrence is indicated by 
the order of the pointer used.  That is, we can 
associate information with the order of the link- 
ages such that the*first pointer corresponds to the 
real-time sequence of operations on field x, 
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the second corresponds to a later reference and 
the third corresponds to an update of an earlier 
occurrence. 
ii) Update some version (most likely the latest) 
of an earlier occurrence. 
Suppose the sequence of entries so far is 
32|(32,t4,C,-)(10,t3,R, )(12,t2,U, HlO.t^R )(10,t ,C,-) 
I *  *» J  It  z  It L      I        +    ° 
and it is asked to update the latest version of an 
earlier occurrence.  (Notice we have two occurrences 
with values of latest versions 32 and 12). 
Update x(t2)  to 25 at time tc. 
I 1        ml } • 
32|(25,t5,U,' )(32,t4,C,-)(10,t3,R,, )(12,t2>U,, )(10,t1,R, 
(10,to,C,-) 
t  
At least two cases of error propagation are 
apparent.  The first involves a blind fix wherein 
the value of the record or field is changed as 
specified independently of subsequent usage.  The 
second case is an application - dependent repair 
to values of later occurrences, adding for example 
the increment 15 to all occurrences of x after t 3' 
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It is the responsibility of the user of the 
audit trail interface to take the necessary 
corrective action to repair later values and 
determine who depended on the incorrect values. 
One way to do that is to have a "user intent" 
code in the interface denoting intended audit 
trail usage of this particular user. 
The "user intent" code specifies a list of 
operations to be performed by the particular user. 
Issuing an intention list is an event that can be 
registered in the audit trail.  Processing the 
intention list is similar to processing an audit 
trail during crash recovery or backing out. 
Concept of a cutoff period.  A cutoff period is a 
distinct real-time interval in the time-ordered 
sequence of audit trail entries that has been 
useful to record in a catalog.  The time intervals 
may be (^I'^o^     anc*  ^t4,t3^  *n t*ie aD°ve example. 
The cutoff periods will generally be chosen to 
coincide with some legal or accounting date require- 
ments such as end-of-month or end-of-yeaxf. 
It is an interval containing valuable informa- 
tion for tracing the auditing trail.  It may be 
generated on a time basis (e.g. after a constant 
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amount of time) or on an information basis, reporting 
critical sections of the sequence. 
Its purpose is to improve the efficiency of 
the software in responding to auditor requests of 
the form "List all updates to fields so-and-so 
between January 13 and February 8". 
The cutoff•periods serve as "milestones" in 
9 
the sequence of events reporting "moments" of the 
audit-trail, and they can be arranged as an index 
for the file of the audit trail.  Thus the audit 
trail can be used in a "similar" way as indexed- 
sequential files are being used. 
Since a cutoff period is being recorded in a 
catalog}it has to be an interval, rather than a 
single time; associated with key information for 
the sequence of actions. 
Cutoff periods can be nested and/or overlapped, 
but to do so a special reason has to exist. Other- 
wise a linear sequence of cutoff periods is suffi- 
"7 cient for the proper tracing of the audit trail. 
A cutoff period permits the user/system to have 
multiple entry points to the time-ordered sequence 
of audit trail entries.  Without a cutoff period 
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concept, a sequential scan is implied from the 
latest activity of the field, serially back through 
time, through all preceding activities until the 
desired field generation is found.  A cutoff period 
concept implies better performance by permitting 
the user/system to choose the cutoff period entry 
point to the audit trail^ that is later than and 
nearest to the desired value. 
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EXAMPLES 
In page 6 we said that a schema is a chart of 
types of data that are used and that it gives the 
names of the entities and attributes, and also specifies 
the relations between them.  We are going to use such 
a schema, in a simplified way, to illustrate the ideas 
we implemented in the methodology we proposed.  We 
point out here> that the format of the entries of an 
audit trail, the information they should include for 
its efficient use, greatly depend on the particular 
database and its user.  They also depend on the purpose 
for which the audit trail is going to be used.  The 
database we will be dealing with is a simplified one 
for airlines reservations.  Its conceptual schema is 
given in Figure 3. 
We will be dealing with the field PASSENGER-NAME, 
developing an audit-trail for it,which is going to 
record the history of activities on it and hence to be 
used in the case the reservations are lost, or a pas- 
senger argues about his (her) reservation. 
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Figure (3) 
A Simple Canonical Schema for Airlines Reservations 
Typical operations which may affect this field are: 
1) Creative (C) reservation for person A for a 
specific flight. 
2) Change (CH) the persons' name to another one. 
3) Cancel (CN) persons' reservation. 
4) Replace (RP) A's reservation by reservation 
for B. 
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A sequence of actions by these operations is 
listed below, as are the resulting audit-trail entries. 
If this audit-trail is developed for a specific 
flight only, the key of the flight (FLIGHT-NO+DATE) is 
important for the recorded information, as it owns 
this information.  On the other hand it is redundant 
to have a separate entry in the entries for this key. 
So the solution to this problem is to create a header 
at the beginning of the action including needed infor- 
mation relevant to all entries.  Such information here 
is FLIGHT-NO+DATE and the identifier of the field 
for which we create the trail.  (Here, PASSENGER-NAME), 
The header is specified by the auditor, and points to 
the first value of field.  In this example it should 
be: 
(HEADER, FLIGHT-NO+DATE(VALUE), PASSENGER-NAME, tQ) 
since  tQ is the identifier of the first audit-entry 
as it is explained later. 
1.  CREATE RESERVATION.  A new occurrence of the 
passenger record is being created.  Since the 
occurrence contain a PASSENGER-NAME field, the 
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action being created must be recorded in the audit 
trail.  The operation here is CREATE(C), but it is 
also important to know who creates the reservation. 
So a proper way to record the operation is AGENCY- 
COD (C) where AGENCY-CODE provides information 
about "who".  The audit-trail entry then should be: 
JOHN-JONES**|(JOHN-JONES, t, AGENCY-CODE(C), ***) 
where JOHN-JONES is the Passengers' name, t  is 
the time the reservation is being made, and the 
three asterisks correspond to pointers for link- 
ages.  We reserve the first pointer to correspond 
to the real-time sequence of operations on field 
PASSENGER-NAME, the second corresponds to a 
reference to an item changed or created earlier, 
and the third to an update of a prior entry of 
the audit trail as we mentioned before. We assume 
that the time stamp (t here) is sufficient enough 
to be used as an identifier for the audit-entry. 
**Current value of field in most recently created 
occurrence. 
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2. CHANGE the persons * name.  The new entry now Is 
JONAHSON-JOHN |(JONAHSON-JOHN, tp AGENCY-CODE(CH), tQ **) 
where in place of an asterisk in the first pointer 
positions we have the identifier (t )  of the 
entry it is linked to. 
3. CREATE RESERVATION 
STEVE-GAUSS|(STEVE-GAUSS, t^  AGENCY-CODE(C), tx **) 
4. CANCEL RESERVATION of JONAHSON-JOHN 
STEVE-GAUSS| (—, t3, AGENCY-CODE(CN), **t1) 
Now in place of the last asterisk we have the 
identifier of the entry it refers to, because it. 
is a later reference. 
5. REPLACE RESERVATION of STEVE-GAUSS by reservation 
for NICLAUS-WIRTH 
NICLAUS-WIRTH|(NICLAUS-WIRTH, t^, AGENCY-CODE(RP), **t2> 
Again the replaced asterisk shows that we have an 
update of a prior generation. 
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(ii) 
Now we consider the situation we are auditing the 
OCCUPATION-NO field for,say,two different occurence 
of the record type with key FLIGHT-NO+DATE:  for 
example, for flights 772 and 056 of 05-12.  We assume 
their individual audit trails have been developed as 
exposed before, and their last values are 32 and 135 
respectively.  It is going to be evident later that 
here we have to keep identification information also 
„ with the latest value which is the identifier of the 
value.  (e.g. OCCUPATION-772-05-12(32)). 
One reasonable operation is MERGE FLIGHT 772-05-12 
into FLIGHT 056-05-12.  If we continue auditing 
OCCUPATION-NO for flight 056 without considering the 
new event the auditing-trail is not complete.  The 
new operation MERGE has to point to the latest values 
of OCCUPATION-NO.  That is 
OCCUPATION-772-05-12(32)|(32, t±, AGENCY-CODE(U), t±1**) 
OCCUPATION-056-05-12(135)|(135, t., AGENCY-CODE0X t. x**) 
are the latest values of the individual audit-trails and 
we must have now: 
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OCCUPATION-056-05-12(167)j(167,   tfc, 
EMPLOYEE-CODE(MERCE, (OCCUPATION-772-05-12-1±) 
(OCCUPATION-05 6- 05 -12-1, ) ),***) 
J ■ 
where (OCCUPATION-772-05-12-t±)     and 
(OCCUPATION-056-05-12-t.)  are the values of pointers 
associated with the operation MERGE and the point to 
the values 32 and 135 respectively. 
From the discussion we come to the conclusion 
that some operations have to be associated with 
pointers.  The number of pointers the operations need 
is a variable^and it seems to be inefficient to pro- 
vide them with a large number of pointers.  The 
operations have to be provided pointers dynamically 
as they need them. 
s 
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J 
WHAT HAS TO BE RECORDED 
Following is a list of candidates that have been 
identified as being useful or required to be recorded 
in the audit trail. 
The name of the data being operated upon.  The 
naming convention assumed in this presentation is that 
the data name remains constant for all versions of its 
values.  If the audit trail has a scope of many data 
sets and the same field can appear in more than one 
data set, then obviously at least a two level naming 
scheme is required (e.g., data set name, field name). 
Both data set and field name can be factored out of 
each audit trail entry and placed into a dictionary. 
The dictionary would contain descriptive information, 
constant across a cutoff period, to fully interpret 
the audit trail entries.  In reality, an audit trail 
is also needed on the dictionary to track name changes 
and synonyms of a field. 
The new value after the operation.  The new value 
is recorded after the operation.  The value prior to 
the operation is available as the prior operation's 
result.  One possibility is that the prior value and 
the new operation are recorded in the same audit trail 
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entry, thereby making the prior value immediately 
addressable.  This gives high-performance capability 
to the data restore of the original value at the 
expense of redundancy of the value in the audit trail. 
Operation causing audit trail entry.  This 
operation is the recording of what interaction with the 
data caused the entry to be made in the audit trail. 
Those that are ready candidates are as follows: 
(a) Create or insert new data  (b) Delete data 
(c) Update  (d) Reference data for the purpose of 
commitment (using this data as the basis of future 
actions), and  (e) References for any reason (such as 
debugging purposes). 
Time stamp.  The actual time that the given 
operation occurs is recorded.  The granularity of the 
time stamp must be fine enough so that no two opera- 
o 
tions have the same time stamp. 
Status flags for each generation.   A status flag 
will optionally be included (as specified by a descriptor 
defining what is to be recorded) with each audit trail 
entry.  Some of the usages of the status flags might be: 
a.  "Bad" data indicator - A program detecting a 
wrong or suspected wrong value could set a 
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parameter in the audit trail interface that, in 
turn, would set the status flag to the "bad" 
data indication, 
b.  Purge control parameters - Certain conditions 
may be indicated in status flags such that 
when a purge routine scans audit trail entries, 
it may automatically remove audit trail entries 
from system control. 
Program identification and version.  The program ' 
identification interacting with the data is recorded. 
Transaction identification.  The unique trans- 
action identification must be recorded so that the 
scope and unit of work is bounded and identifiable for 
reasons such as resource allocation, backout, etc. 
User identification.  The identification of the 
user is required to be recorded for recovery and audit 
reasons. 
Terminal identification. The terminal the user 
was at when he entered the transaction is optionally 
recorded in the audit trail. 
Time sequence linkages.  As indicated before, at 
least two time sequences are recorded in the audit 
trail.  The first one is the real-time sequence of 
operations against the data.  By traversing this 
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sequence from the latest time to the entry of data 
creation, every operation on every version of every 
occurrence of the data can be examined.  The second 
sequence is the correct logical value for each occurrence 
of the data.  This is not the real "time of happening" 
sequence, since the value of an earlier occurrence can 
be corrected'later in time. 
Some of the required candidates, to be recorded 
in the audit trail as they have just been listed, are 
not present in the proposed example of the methodology. 
Especially candidates which do not change during the 
whole process (e.g. Transaction identification User id, 
Terminal id, etc.).  We can create a header record of 
fixed format for the part of-the audit trail affected 
by those and include them into the header.  The header 
should be present at the beginning of the audit record- 
ing and a wake up signal should be "on" when one of 
the header-record fields is being changed, and then 
the updated header has to be recorded again.  This is 
efficient if these fields (header-record fields) do 
not change very often.  If they do so they have to be 
"regular" entries in the audit recording. 
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AUDIT TRAIL FORMAT 
Some of the considerations and tradeoffs in 
designing an audit trail format are examined here. 
Comparibility with current data set formats.  An 
audit trail format must be designed so that existing 
data set formats continue to be satisfactory for the 
"now" values, whereas future activity against the "now" 
value is recorded in a new format.  If this can be done, 
no migration to a new format is required.  Activity 
against the data set is recorded in a new format suit- • 
able for the audit trail requirements, whereas the 
new "now" value is preserved in existing data formats. 
Factoring by component of audit trail entry. 
Depending upon the mode of processing (e.g. batch 
versus on-line) various components of an audit trail 
entry may be factored out of each entry, thereby 
saving much storage space. 
In a batch environment, user identification, 
transaction identification, and terminal identification 
can be factored to the job level, whereas program 
identification and representation can be factored only 
to the job-step level.  In an on-line environment, no 
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general factoring rules are readily apparent, assuming 
random arrival of different transaction types. 
Audit trail content reconstruction.  The audit 
trail must be physically reconstruetable if damage 
occurs and is detected.  Detection of damage to the 
audit trail is critical.  Use of a damaged audit trail 
entry under the assumption that it is correct constitutes 
automatic error propagation.  Worse yet is the fact 
that system recovery is invalid or impossible to per- 
form since the vehicle (the audit trail) that would 
have permitted recovery is invalidated.  Damage repair 
of the audit trail may be effected by duplication of 
the audit trail, Hamming codes, use of a checkpoint 
and journal, and other ways of recreating the original 
data. 
Integrated versus distributed audit trail.  In 
an implementation of an audit trail, several criteria 
have been identified that would be options in deter- 
mining whether one integrated audit trail or several 
physical audit trails should be provided.  The criteria 
for determining the scope of entries in an audit trail 
are examined below. 
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a.' An audit trail per data set.  An audit trail per 
data set Is motivated primarily by the concept of 
the "now" value being a special case of all versions 
of a unit of data.  Another assumption is that the 
total history of activities across all users, pro- 
grams, time intervals, etc. is important to be 
, directly associated with the data.  Finally, just 
as in an integrated data base environment (i.e. 
minimally redundant data), one data set is shared 
by many programs and users.  Here, the audit trail 
per data set is the central repository for all 
historical activities against the data set. 
b. User or class of users.  An audit trail could be 
partitioned into disjoint exhaustive users or 
classes of users. 
c. Program or application program system.  Separate 
audit trails might be desirable for eactr program 
or family of programs.  Audit trail implementations 
and options could be tailored to each application 
program using this criterion. 
d. Time intervals. The cutoff period concept is the 
facility for separating the audit trail into dis- 
crete time intervals.  If, in addition, the Data 
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Base Administrator can change the audit trail 
options during each new cutoff period, the system 
would provide a general audit trail partitioning 
scheme as a function of time. 
e. Logical data base.  It may be desirable to keep 
one audit trail per logical data base.  One audit 
trail may exist for all the information in the 
data base on a common subject.  In this case, one 
audit trail would have a scope of one or more data 
sets. 
f. Operations upon data.  Separate audit trails may be 
kept per type of operation upon the data.  For 
example, update operations may be recorded in one 
audit trail on a faster device for quicker data 
restore capability, whereas data references are 
in a separate audit trail for the auditor, security, 
officer^ etc. 
g. Cominations of the above.  Combinations of the above 
criteria will undoubtedly prove most useful for any 
given implementation.  For example, specific 
operations upon a logical data base may have 
different cutoff periods in separate audit trails. 
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Method of synchronization between distributed 
audit trails.  If related recorded data has been 
distributed between more than one physical audit trail 
or even within the same audit trail, a mechanism must 
exist that permits the distributed data to be re- 
collected according to some criteria.  This method 
of synchronizing entries in different audit trails is 
performed according to criteria such as common program 
identifications, the same time interval, or in general, 
equal values of components of audit trail entries. 
This can be used as an alternative to the organi- 
zation we proposed.  Namely if it is not necessary to 
record the whole sequence of actions (especially if 
it is extremelify large), we record segments of it. 
The segments may be recorded on different physical 
media.  The related recorded data have been distributed 
now and a mechanism is needed to recollect them.  The 
recollection is needed for comparisons and easy checking. 
The command languages, needed to access it, have not 
to be different.  It is the responsibility of the 
mechanism to do so, which turns as a responsibility 
to the software responding to the auditor commands. 
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USES OF AN AUDIT TRAIL 
If a system crashes (without damaging secondary 
storage) the files affected by the processes running 
during the failure can be restored to their states 
before these processes started.  The audit trail can 
be processed backwards for backing out.  Also, a single 
transaction (of job) can be backed out in case a dead- 
lock occurs or the transaction fails.  The data 
affected by the transaction can be restored to their 
state before the transaction (or job) was started. 
Traditional recovery techniques for filing 
systems may be insufficient to prevent the loss of 
the changes caused by the most recent operations per- 
formed in the filing system.  The usual method, in- 
cremental dumping, checkpoints the files at regular 
intervals, but operations performed on files after 
the last checkpoint will be lost if a crash occurs. 
This does not matter in many 'operating systems because 
jobs can be resubmitted or operation can be redone. 
However, in systems where updates are made online from 
different sources, such as in banking or airline 
reservations, this method may be unacceptable:  one 
cannot afford to lose any update should such system 
fail. 
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Another reason that traditional recovery techniques 
for filing systems may be insufficient is that data 
management systems are physically organized very 
differently than filing systems.  The difference in 
design parameters may make traditional schemes unsuit- 
able for most data structures used in existing data- 
base management systems. 
In systems like these an audit trail can provide 
a solution.  Before a transaction is performed in the 
database, it is recorded on the auditing tape.  This 
procedure is carried out without buffers or by imple- 
menting a "log tape write ahead protocal" to protect 
against crashes that destroy the mainstore contents. 
Buffers may lead to inconsistencies between the data- 
base and the audit trail.  If the buffers are lost 
after a crash the database will be in an inconsistent 
state, and the audit trail will be incomplete; so it 
cannot be used to restore the correct state.  The log 
tape write ahead protocal avoids this problem.  It 
is being used as a differential file where all changes 
that would be made to main file as a result of trans- 
actions performed are registered in the tape before 
they being the updated values of the fields.  We are 
counting here on the operating systems to complete the 
write operations at the proper time. 
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